God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural
Part One: Creation as a Divine Act

THESIS I
God Alone Created the World, In Time and with Perfect Freedom

by Fr. John A. Hardon, S.J.

Allegory of the Creation of the Cosmos by Dominicus van Wijnen

“All things were made through him, and without him was not anything made that was made.” (John 1:3)

Just as deity describes the intimate nature of God, so the whole cosmos or everything which is not God depends entirely on Him as its first and ultimate cause. The world, therefore, otherwise than God is not self-sufficient but contingent on God. Its dependence comprehends all things, from the dawn of creation to the consummation of the present order, and for spiritual beings – along with such bodily things as God will sustain – continues for eternity.

Although expressed in a single proposition, the present thesis makes three assertions: that the world is not self-existent but was created by God alone, that creation has not gone on forever but took place in time, and that God was not constrained to create but made the world out of nothing by His own sovereignly free will.

Terminology

Creation may be defined in two ways, where each definition complements the other. More commonly it is said to be “the production of something from nothing of itself or its subject (productio rei ex nihilo sui et subjecti).” Here the term “production” describes the genus, common to all effects, and “from nothing” tells the specific difference which characterizes creation, on two levels. There is nothing “of itself,” i.e., something new is produced which did not exist before; and nothing “of its subject,” i.e., there was no material out of which the product was made. This latter quality ultimately distinguishes creation from all other kinds of production.

Or creation may be defined, with the Vatican Council, as the “production of material and spiritual things in their whole substance, done by God out of nothing” (DB 1805). Here we distinguish three elements: 1) production means that the action of God is in the order of efficient causality; 2) in their whole substance indicates that there is nothing in the created effect which does not depend on the creative divine act, hence the difference between creation and other productions, where the efficient cause merely induces a new form into an already existing subject or material; 3) out of nothing says the same thing negatively, in the sense that no part or element of the creature existed before its creation. In other words, creation is the absolute beginning of a thing.

The world is synonymous with “universe,” and includes the whole complexes of reality, material and spiritual, terrestrial and celestial, which exists outside of God. We prescind here from the special creation of. human souls when united with bodies in ordinary conception.

God alone should be taken literally, as declaring that He is the unique cause of creation, with no creature cooperating as principal co-cause or even as physical instrumental agent operating under God.

In time may be taken either negatively or positively. Taken negatively it means that the duration of the world is antecedently limited, that is, the world did not exist from all eternity. Taken positively it means the world began in time.

With perfect freedom describes how utterly contingent the world is with relation to divine liberty. Consequently the existence of the world depends only on the will of God, in the sense that: 1) there is no internal exigency arising from the nature of God or one of His attributes which requires Him to create; 2) there is no need for God to create, as though He would have been less perfect had He not created; and 3) God was not only free to create or not, but He was also free to create this or another world had He so chosen.

Adversaries

In general there are two types of adversaries directly against the thesis that God created the world out of nothing: Monists who confound the world with God and Dualists who postulate two ultimate principles in the universe.

The Monistic position logically negatives creation, since unless God and the world are really distinct there can be no question of the latter being produced by the former out of nothing. Historically we may distinguish three kinds of Pantheists. Those who profess substantial pantheism claim that all things, or at least all spiritual reality, are produced by emanation from the divine substance. Thus Spinoza and Fichte. Essential pantheists say there is only one essence in the world, which is divine, and whose manifestations we commonly call creatures, as in Schelling. Evolutionary pantheism holds that God is universal and indefinite Being, which determines itself by evolution, and in this way constitutes all things. It is also called the Monism of Absolute Being, whose outstanding promoter was Hegel. Materialists, whether Marxist or other, belong to this class since they claim that only matter exists or at least that matter is the ultimate source of all being.

Dualists are against the thesis by removing something in the world from divine creative action. They either assert the coexistence of two ultimate principles, good and evil, as sources of spirit and matter respectively – like the Manicheans; or claim that God is only “arranger” of pre-existent chaotic matter – as was taught by the Platonists.

God’s liberty in creation has been variously denied by the ancient Gnostics and modern Semi-rationalists like Gunther; also by Leibniz with his “best possible world.” The old Aristotelians and present day Kantians deny creation in time; and Pius XII condemned a theory that supernature was not freely created.

The specific adversaries which follow are examples of representative modern positions:

1. Mikhail Bakunin: Materialist Evolution of the Universe.

By these words ‘matter’ and ‘material’ we understand the totality, the hierarchy of real entities, beginning with the most simple organic bodies and ending with the structure and functioning of the train of the greatest genius; the most sublime feelings, the greatest thoughts, the most heroic acts, acts of self-sacrifice, duties as well as rights, the voluntary renunciation of one’s own welfare, of one’s egoism – as well as the manifestations of organic life, chemical properties and actions, electricity, light, heat, the natural gravitation of bodies. All that constitutes, in our view, so many different but at the same time closely interlinked evolutions of that totality of the real world which we call matter.

And note well, we do not regard this totality as a sort of absolute and everlastingly creative substance, as the pantheists do, but as the perpetual result produced and reproduced anew by the concurrence of an infinite series of actions and reactions, by the incessant transformations of real beings who are born and who die in the midst of this infinity. – The Political Philosophy of Bakunin (G.P. Maximoff, editor), 1953, p. 69.

2. Alfred North Whitehead: God Is perfected along with the World He “Creates.”

God is not the beginning in a sense of being in the past of all members. He is the presupposed actuality of conceptual operation, in unison of becoming with every other creative act. Thus, by reason of the relativity of all things, there is a reaction of the world upon God. The completion of God’s nature into a fulness of physical feeling is derived from the objectification of the world in God. He shares with every new creation its actual world; and the concrescent creature is objectified in God as a novel element in God’s objectification of that actual world.

It is as true to say that God is permanent and the World fluent, as that the World is permanent and God is fluent. It is as true to say that God is one and the World many, as that the World is one and God many. It is as true to say that the World is immanent in God, as that God is immanent in the World. It is as true to say that God transcends the World, as that the World transcends God. It is as true to say that God creates the World, as that the World creates God.” – Process and Reality, 1929, pp. 188, 192.

3. W.T. Stace: Problem of Evil versus a Perfect Deity as Creator.

If God is the ultimate source of everything, then he is the ultimate source of evil; and how is this consistent with his perfect goodness? Hume wrote: ‘Epicurus’ old questions are still unanswered. Is Deity willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?’

The point to notice is that the whole force of Hume’s argument depends on taking all the terms used in it literally. It is necessary perhaps to remind the reader of the fact that what we are attempting to show is only that the doctrine of the existence of God, if taken literally, is a myth.

All attempts to solve this problem on the level of literal interpretation are obvious absurdities. Some have said that evil is not a positive, but only a negative fact. It is only the absence of goodness, and God cannot be held responsible for creating a nothingness. But this is to assert that pain and evil do not really exist at all, which is absurd.

Others take refuge in the concept of mystery. The ways of God are a mystery to the human mind, and we must accept evil as one of these mysteries. But this is both illogical and inconsistent. For the same people will insist that the good and beautiful things in the world are evidence of Gods goodness. But if so, by exactly the same logic, the evil things must be admitted to be evidence of either his badness or his impotence. – Readings in the Philosophy of Religion (John A. Mourrant, editor), 1954, p. 3.

4. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Necessity to Create the Best Possible World.

I am unable to approve the opinion of some moderns who boldly maintain that what God does is not of the highest degree of perfection, and that he could have acted much better. For it seems to me that the consequences of this sentiment are altogether contrary to the glory of God. ‘As the less evil contains an element of good, so the less good contains an element of evil.’ And to act with less perfection than one could have acted, is to act imperfectly. To point out that an architect could have done better is to find fault with his work.

This also goes against Holy Scripture, when it assures us of the goodness of the works of God. For since imperfections descend to infinity, in whatever way God had made His works they would still have been good in comparison with less perfect works, if that were enough, but a thing is barely praiseworthy if it is only to be praised in this way. I believe also that an infinity of passages will be found in Divine Scripture and the Holy Fathers in favor of my sentiment, but that hardly any will be found for that of these moderns, which in my opinion is unknown to all antiquity, and is only based on our having too little knowledge of the general harmony of the universe and of the hidden reasons for the conduct of God, which makes us judge rashly that many things could have been improved.

Besides which these moderns take their stand on some unsolid subtleties, for they imagine that nothing is so perfect that there is not something more perfect, which is an error. For example, there is an infinity of regular figures, but one is the most perfect, namely the circle; if a triangle had to be made and there was no determination of the sort of triangle, God would assuredly make an equilateral triangle, because absolutely speaking, this is the most perfect.

They also believe that they are providing thus for the liberty of God, as if it were not the highest liberty to act perfectly, according to sovereign reason. For to believe that God acts in anything without having any reason for His will, besides that it seems that this cannot be, is a sentiment which conforms little with His glory. – Discourse on Metaphysics, 1953, pp. 5-6.

Nota

Thesis, uti stat, est De Fide Definita, sed diversae: partes debent clarius distingui:

  1. Sine ulteriori distinctione de libertate Dei in creatione, omnes tres partes theseos sunt definitae a Concilio Vaticano: “Hic solus verus Deusliberrimo consilio ‘simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam, ac deinde humanam man, who in a way belongs to both orders, as he is composed of spirit and body,'” DB 1783. The quotation is cited from the Fourth Lateran Council, which condemned the Albigenses (DB 128). Moreover the Vatican Council has five canons on the subject, DB 1801-1805.The element of divine liberty in creation has various dogmatic values, according to what aspect of liberty was questioned or denied, and condemned by ecclesiastical authority.
    1. It is De Fide Definita against the Semi-rationalists who claimed that creation arose from absolute internal necessity, while denying that God was free with the liberty of active indifference (DB 1805).
    2. Liberty of specification is at least Theologice Certa, arguing from the superlative “liberrimo consilio” in DB 1783. The same may be said of Rosmini’s so-called moral necessity condemned by Leo XIII in DB 1908.
    3. God’s liberty in creating the supernatural order is at least Auctoritative Certa, from the teaching of Pius XII in Humani Generis, against those who, “misinterpret the gratuity of the supernatural order when they pretend that God cannot create intellectual beings without ordering and calling them to the Beatific vision” (Num. 26).

Theological Proof

Part One: “God Alone Created the World”

  1. Ecclesiastical Documents
    1. The Apostles Creed, “I believe in God the Father Almighty, Creator of heaven and Earth” (DB 6). The Greek text has, “Pisteuomen eis hena Theon patera pantokratora, poieten ouranou kai ges” (DB 9)).
    2. Fourth Lateran Council, “We firmly believe and profess without qualification that there is only one true God, eternal, immense, unchangeable, incomprehensible, omnipotent, and indescribable, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit…they are the one and only principle of all things – Creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal” (DB 428).
    3. Vatican Council, as above, besides the following, that “If anyone denies that there is one true God, Creator and Lord of things visible and invisible: let him be anathema” (DB 1801).
  2. Sacred Scripture
    1. Genesis, chapters 1 and 2, describes the production of the world as the work of God. There are two creation narratives: 1:1 – 2:3 and 2:4-25. What follows comprehends both accounts, the first of which is more generic and covers six days, the second more anthropological and covering only one day. We argue that Genesis describes true creation ex nihilo, although implicitly and in non-technical language because:
      1. In pagan cosmogonies (Babylonian, Egyptian, Phoenician) we find dualism clearly professed, distinguishing between the deity and chaotic matter as two-fold ultimate principles. No such dualism here.
      2. God is said to deal with matter with perfect and absolute freedom as something over which He is master. This would be incompatible with conceiving matter as existing independently of God.
      3. In contrast with this mastery of matter in Genesis, the cosmogonies of other ancient peoples involve a conflict between the deity or Demiurge and the chaos out of which the world is made. Thus in the Babylonian creation epic Enuma elish, chaos is a force opposed to the deity.
      4. It is commonly agreed that the author of Genesis wished to teach monotheism, that only one God is to be worshiped, on whom all other things depend and from whom they are all distinct. Unless, therefore, he meant to include matter among the creatures made by God, the Jews would at least have been confused and tempted to attribute divinity to matter – since all around them were cosmogonies which were not monotheistic.
      5. To say that the work of creation in Genesis means only “second creation,” i.e., ordering of pre-existing matter, would contradict the whole tenor of the Old Testament. Its recurrent theme is the complete dependence of the world in every way upon God, as, for example, in the Psalms (8, 32, 73, 103, 148)
      6. The attribution of creation out of nothing to God is confirmed from the name Yahweh (Exodus 3:11-14), which means either “I am because I am,” i.e., in me is the sole reason of my existence; or more likely, “I am who am,” namely, “I am the existing one. I am therefore to be called Yahweh ‘He is’, since in that name my nature is best expressed as essential existence.” In both cases, Yahweh is alone a se ipso, and the rest of the universe: is ab alio, that is, from yahweh.
    2. Second Maccabees 7:28 quotes the mother of the seven martyred sons as saying to her youngest, “I beseech you, my son, look upon heaven and earth, and all that is in them: and consider that God made them out of nothing (most Greek MSS have ouk ex ontōn epoiēsen, ‘did not make them out of existing matter’), and mankind also.” While the mother is here being quoted and therefore her words as such are not directly inspired, yet they are given with approval by the inspired author. And for our purpose they clearly show that the doctrine of creation was commonly accepted by the Jews of that time.
    3. In the New Testament, God is frequently and without qualification said to have created the world. Thus the early Christians prayed in thanksgiving to God, “Lord, it is you who have made heaven and earth and the sea and all that is in them” (Acts 4:24). And the simple statement of St. Paul to the Hebrews, that “every house is built by someone; but he who created all things is God” (Hebrews 3:4). Or in greater detail, in the Pauline epistles, speaking of Jesus Christ – “He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature. For in Him were all things created in the heavens and on the earth” (Colossians 1:16).
    4. However the classic text in the New Testament is the prologue of St. John, where he says, speaking of the Logos, “All things were made through Him, and without Him was made nothing that was made” (John 1:3). The absolute universality of the creative action of the Word is emphasized by negative repetition in Semitic fashion, “without Him nothing came to be.”
  3. Patristic Evidence
    1. St. Irenaeus, writing against Gnostic dualism, argues that a so-called Demiurge would be powerless to do anything with uncreated and therefore immutable matter: “If uncreated matter is unchangeable, the world could not be created from it, for uncreated matter implies absolute immutability” (Patr. Gr. 7, 1248). The whole of Adversus Haereses has quotable references on the subject.

      In the beginning God created heaven and earth.

    2. St. John Chrysostom saw in Genesis the anticipated refutation of all error on the origin of the word. “This man Moses,” he said, “eradicated all heresies which were later to grow up in the Church, when he laid down the proposition: ‘In the beginning God created heaven and earth.’ If, therefore, some Manichean approach you saying that matter pre-existed, or some other heretic like Marcion or Valentinus or any pagan – reply to him, ‘In the beginning God created heaven and earth'” (patr. Gr. 53, 29).

Part Two: ‘God Created the world with Perfect Freedom.”

  1. Ecclesiastical Documents
    1. The Council of Florence, in the reunion decree for the Jacobites, included the following profession of faith: “When God willed, in His goodness He created all creatures both spiritual and corporeal. These creatures are good because they were made by the Supreme Good, but they are changeable because they were made from nothing” (DB 706).
    2. From the Vatican Council, we have already seen the statement that God created “by a completely free decision (liberrimo consilio).” But more directly against the Semi-rationalists we have the canon, “If anyone …says that God did not create with a will free from all necessity, but that He created necessarily, just as He necessarily loves himself; let him be anathema” (DB 1805).
  2. Sacred ScriptureThe basic Scriptural argument for divine freedom in creation rests on the sovereignty with which God is said to rule the world. This implies corresponding liberty in having brought the world into existence. Thus in the Psalms, “Whatsoever the Lord pleased He has done, in heaven, on earth, in the sea, and in all the depths” (Psalm 134:6).Arguing from theological reason, we must say that God was free in creating or not, creating this world or another. Otherwise He would not be omnipotent, and we know that omnipotence stops only at contradiction. He would not be all wise, since even we can conceive of a world different than the present one. He would not be all perfect, if His divine essence could be the exemplar of only one creatable universe.
  3. Patristic Evidence
    1. St. Augustine, speaking of liberty in general, says that “God was not compelled to make all the things which He made, but He made all the things that He willed. The cause of all things is His will” (Rouet 1490).
    2. More specifically, Augustine teaches that God freely created not only irrational beings or only persons who would practice virtue but also sinners. “God created all beings, not only those which were to persevere in virtue and justice, but those also which were to sin. He created them not in order that they should sin, but that they should be an adornment to the universe, regardless of whether they would will to sin or not” (De Libero Arbitrio 3, 11).
    3. Again commenting on Genesis, “God saw that it was good,” St. Augustine remarks “this is proof enough that what God made is made not from necessity or any need of personal profit but only because of His goodness, that is, because it was good (to create)” (Rouet 1751).

Part Three: “God Created the World in Time”

  1. Ecclesiastical Documents
    1. The Fourth Lateran declares that God created “from the very beginning of time (simul ab initio temporis)” (DB 128).
    2. John XXII condemned three propositions of Master Eckhart as heretical (March 27, 1329):”When he (Eckhart) was asked why God did not produce the world sooner, he replied that God was not able to produce the world sooner because a being cannot act before it exists; therefore, as soon as God existed, He created the world…It may likewise be conceded that the world existed from all eternity.”Likewise, at the same time and once for all, when God existed and when He generated His Son, God, coeternal and coequal to Himself in all things, He also created the world” (DB 501-503).
    3. The Vatican Council re-incorporated the teaching of Fourth Lateran, as quoted above (DB 1783).
  2. Sacred Scripture
    1. Genesis 1:1 uses the phrase, “In the beginning (bereshith),” which may be understood of the absolute beginning of time or of create things (both began together). Taken in that sense, we have an argument for creation in time.
    2. Two other passages in the Old Testament are more explicit. Thus Divine Wisdom is described as existing before the world was made. “I am that word, she says, that was uttered by the mouth of the Most High, the primal birth before ever creation began” (Ecclesiastic us 24:5). And in the Psalms, “Before the mountains were born, or ever Thou hadst brought forth the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting Thou art, 0 God” (Psalm 89:2).
    3. In the Gospel of St. John, we have the prayer of Christ to His Father, declaring His existence before the world was made. “Father, glorify me with Thyself, with the glory that I had with Thee before the world existed…Thou hast loved me before the creation of the world” (John 17:5,24).
  3. Patristic EvidenceWith the possible exception of Origen, the Fathers uniformly teach that the world is not eternal. Says Tatian, “Matter is not without a beginning, as God is,” (Contra Grace. 5). St. Basil gives a reason for the In principio of Genesis: “Because many believed that the world was eternal, like God, Moses purposely chose these words, ‘In the beginning God created heaven and earth’ ” (Hom.in Hexaemeron, 1). According to Ambrose, “In the beginning of time God made heaven and earth; for time began simultaneously with, not prior to, the world” (Praef. in Hexaemeron). St. Augustine adds the clarification that “the world was doubtless not made in time, but with time” (De Civitate Dei, V, 6).

Kerygmatic Development

The doctrine of creation is not only theologically fundamental as expressive of God’s relation to the world, but practically it becomes the source of deep inspiration for prayer and of motivation in the spiritual life. What follows is intended to stimulate reflection and further study on the implications of this dogma, for immediate personal profit and for use in the apostolate.

  1. Fatherhood of God: In the Apostles’ Creed we say, “I believe in God, the Father Almighty, Creator of heaven and earth.” How do we understand the title “Father” in this context, and what reasons are there for attributing creation to the First Person of the Trinity? How does this apply to the invocation, “Our Father,” in the Lord’s Prayer?
  2. Divine Omnipotence: It is said that the sublimity of an effect is determined by the disproportion between material used and the thing produced. Why should this be true, and how does it bear on the greatness of creation, where God brings the fullness of being into existence out of nothing?
  3. Nothingness of Creatures: More than once the saints and sacred writers speak of the world and themselves as nothing, in comparison with God. Given the dogma of creation, why is this true? What are the consequences for cultivating humility, not so much in our relation to others as in our relationship to God?
  4. Creation and Providence: Since the world was made by God out of nothing, it would lapse into nothingness except for His sustaining hand. Why is this so, or in other words, what connection is there between the need of God to bring the world into being, and the need of Him for remaining in existence?
  5. Problem of Evil: St. Augustine tells us that “were it not good for evil things to exist,the omnipotent God would certainly not allow evil to be.” What are some of these good results that God must have foreseen in creating things which He knew would do evil?
  6. Eternal World: We know on faith that the world did not exist from all eternity. Is there anything intrinsically impossible about the opposite having been true, that is, could the world have existed forever without a beginning? If not, why not; and if it could have, why (as far as we can tell) did God create the world in time?
  7. Changeableness of Creatures: The Council of Florence says that “creatures are good because they were made by the Supreme Good, but they are changeable because they were made from nothing.” How are these two doublets related, namely goodness in creatures because made by an infinitely good God, and changeableness because made out of nothing?
  8. Best Possible World: Optimists like Leibniz claim this world is the best possible, because otherwise we creatures rashly criticize the handiwork of the Creator. In what sense is this the best possible world; and in what sense is it emphatically not? Moreover, what consequences would logically follow if we held with Leibniz that the world has optimum perfection?
  9. Foundation of justice: Justice is defined as the virtue which gives to each one his due. What then do we mean when we speak of God as infinitely just, since as our Creator He owed and owes us nothing? On the other hand, what do we mean by our obligation to practice the virtue of religion, which is justice in our relationship to God?
  10. Origin of Life: Natural scientists say that every living being has the faculty of procreating its kind. Where there is no life, no life can be born. According to them this is a general law of nature; in biology the fundamental law. Any exceptions therefore would be a miracle. Prescinding from the origin of the human species, may we hold, dogmatically, that life might have evolved from non-living matter? If so, how defend this position on philosophical grounds; and if not, why is it untenable on the basis of pure reason?
  11. Creation and Evolution: As a matter of record, the idea of evolution is not modern. St. Augustine wrote, “It is one thing to form and direct the creature from the most profound and ultimate pole of causation, and He who does this is alone the Creator, God. But it is quite another thing to apply some operation from without in proportion to the power and faculties assigned by Him, so that at this time or that, and in this or that way, the thing created may emerge” (De Trinitate, 3, 9, 16). Augustine goes on to compare the world to a mother who is with child, and like her was (or may still be) productive of new things that develop from the embryonic stage. What significance does the theory of evolution have in clarifying and deepening our knowledge of the Creator? Yet what are its limitations, apart from the question of man’s possible origin from a lower species?
  12. Sources of Pantheism: Since the Vatican Council condemned Pantheism, this error has become more widespread than ever before. It directly contradicts our dogma of creation, and must be answered in the premises on which it is based. Friedrich Paulsen defended Pantheism on two grounds: “If God.,” he said, “creates all things out of nothing, as monotheistic theology claims, then He is in truth the sole being, and all objects are in Him and through Him. On the other hand if things are universally and uniformly correlated, then all processes are joined together into a single and comprehensive process – the unitary structure of the world. This gives the notion of unity in all change, and the notion of the unity of substance” (Introduction to philosophy, p.48). How do we answer these two arguments: one from a vain origin of all creatures and the other from the universal correlation of things in the world?
  13. Creation Myths: Ancient cosmogonies among the Babylonians, Egyptians and others seem to parallel the account of creation in Genesis to a degree that comparative religionists often dismiss the latter as only a redaction of the former. How do they differ, and to what extent may we admit a dependence of the author of Genesis on creation narratives then current outside the Jewish nation?
  14. Modern Dualism: Manicheans and Albigenses are not only historical relics. Their basic postulate of dualism is a familiar refuge of many philosophers of religion today, especially when they try to solve the problem of evil on purely rational grounds, and independently of faith. Why is dualism only an escape from the problem and not its solution? Yet how does the Catholic doctrine of demonology help to explain at least some aspects of evil, and the irreconcilable conflict between the spirit of good and the spirit of evil?
  15. Grades and Variety in Creation: The differences and varieties of being in creation are common experience. What do they show us about the wisdom of God, His goodness, perfection and justice? And how do they prove His very existence?

STUDY QUESTIONS

Introductory

  1. Why do we call the present treatise De Deo Creante et Elevante?
  2. How does it differ from the courses on the Unity and Trinity of God, and from the treatise De Gratia?
  3. What is the difference between creation as a divine act and divine fact?
  4. What are some of the values to be derived from the treatise – in terms of certain principles of faith on which rests the whole of Christian morality?

Terminology

  1. Give two familiar definitions of creation.
  2. Briefly explain each definition; in the first what is the meaning of “ex nihilo sui et subjecti,” and in the second the meaning of “secundum totam suam substantiam”?
  3. What is the classical meaning of kosmos, used in the New Testament?
  4. How does “first creation” differ from “second creation’s”?
  5. What independence do we predicate of God in saying that He created alone?
  6. We say that God was free in creating with a liberty of active indifference, of exercise and of specification. Explain.
  7. What is time? And what exactly do we mean by saying that God created in time?

Adversaries

  1. What are the three common types of pantheism? Describe each.
  2. What are the two forms of Dualism, and how are they against the thesis?
  3. Briefly state how the Semirationalists, Leibniz and Kantians are opposed to liberty or temporal creation, i.e., to divine freedom in creating or to creation in time?

Dogmatic Value

  1. Give the full statement of the Vatican doctrine on creation in DB 1783.
  2. Briefly indicate how each part of the thesis is defined doctrine on the basis of DB 1783.
  3. Distinguish the three levels of dogmatic value as regards divine liberty in creation.

Theological Proof

Part one

  1. Give the text of the Fourth Lateran Council doctrine on creation, DB 128.
  2. Why is the entire Trinity said, in Lateran, to be the Creator?
  3. What verses in Genesis give the two accounts of creation? How do these two creation narratives differ?
  4. What is the essence of our proof for creation from Genesis?
  5. How do pagan cosmogonies differ from the Genesis account?
  6. Show how the name Yahweh confirms the Scripture proof for creation.
  7. How do we use the quoted text in II Maccabees to support the thesis?
  8. How does the Scripture theme of the world’s absolute dependence on God serve to prove the thesis?
  9. Briefly explain a “creation” text from St. John or one of the Pauline epistles.
  10. How did Ireneus argue against the Gnostic theory of creation?
  11. What was the Demiurge about which the Fathers wrote in their refutation of Gnosticism?

Part Two

  1. Explain the statement of the Council of Florence that “creatures are good because they were made by the Supreme Good, but they are changeable because they were made from nothing.”
  2. Comment on the significance of “liberrimo consilio” in the Vatican Council.
  3. How do we reason to God’s liberty in creation from the Scripture theme of God’s absolute sovereignty in ruling the world?
  4. Explain the statement of St. Augustine, that God created creatures which He foresaw would sin, “not in order that they should sin, but that they should be an adornment to the universe.”

Part Three

  1. What is the exact meaning of the phrase in Fourth Lateran that God created “simul ab initio temporis”?
  2. May we legitimately argue from the Church’s teaching that not only the visible but also the angelic creation did not exist from eternity?
  3. Who was master Eckhart, whom John XXII condemned on the subject of creation in time?
  4. Under what condition may we reason from bereshith in Genesis to the creation of the world in time?
  5. Work out the proof for creation in time from a text in the 0ld Testament and one in the New.
  6. Why does St. Ambrose say that “time began simultaneously with, not prior to, the world”? And Augustine say that “the world was doubtless not made in time, but with time”?

Copyright © 1998 Inter Mirifica